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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation 
of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, State Engineer 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, 
a corporation; KENNECOTT COPPER COR-
PORATION, a corporation; SALT LAKE 
CITY, a municipal corporation; and, 
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, a public corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Intervenors-Appellants• 
CASE NO, 14023 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
i 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent Provo City filed this action on January 11, 1974, 
against the State Engineer, requesting the District Court to set aside 
or modify Certificate of Appropriation No. 36 86 which was issued by 
the State Engineer on May 3, 1949, and to allow Respondent the use of 
more water from the sources covered by said Certificate. The only 
question on appeal is whether Respondent's action is barred for its 
failure to file this action until 23 years and 254 days after Certifi-
cate No. 3686 was issued. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants filed a motion to dismiss Respondent's Complaint on 
the grounds that the District Court lacked jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter under the provisions of Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Anno-
tated 195 3, as amended, and that the action was barred by the express 
terms of Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 19 53, as amended• The 
District Court denied Appellants1 motion by Order dated February 14, 
1975. On March 11, 1975, Appellants filed a Petition for Intermediate 
Appeal which was granted by this Court on April 30, 19 75. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the Order of the District Court, and 
a remand to the District Court with directions to dismiss this action 
with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent filed this action against the State Engineer on Jan-
uary 11, 19 73, asking the District Court to compel the State Engineer 
to issue Respondent an amended certificate for 79 9 acre feet of water 
annually, or, in the alternative, to set aside the proof of beneficial 
use which Respondent had previously filed (October 1942), to allow Res-
pondent a reasonable time within which to file a new proof, and to have 
the State Engineer issue a new certificate in accordance with the proof 
submitted (R. 3). The State Engineer filed an Answer to Respondent's 
Complaint on February 7, 1973 (R. 7). The Provo River Water Users 
Association, Kennecott Copper Corporation, Salt Lake City and the Cen-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tral Utah Water Conservancy District moved to intervene in this action 
(R. 11) and their motion was granted on January 25, 1974 (R. 56). In-
terveners claim rights to the use of waters from the Provo River/Utah 
Lake System (R. 11). 
As used in this brief, Appellants will include both Intervenors 
and the State Engineer. However, when the discussion is limited to 
one of these parties, they will be referred to as State Engineer and 
Intervenors, respectively. 
Appellants moved to dismiss Respondent's Complaint on the ground 
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of 
the action under the provisions of Section 73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, and that this action was barred under the express terms of 
Section 73-3-15, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, because Respondent, after 
waiting more than twenty-three years, was attempting to review the 
decision of the State Engineer in issuing Certificate No. 3686 on May 
3, 1949 (R. 18). This motion was denied (R. 28). 
The applications to appropriate water which form the basis for 
Certificate No. 3686 are Applications Nos. 2077-3-1, 10547 and 10586. 
These Applications were approved in the 19 30's, and various extensions 
of time were allowed within which to submit proof of appropriation 
on said Applications. Proof was submitted by Respondent in October 
of 194 2. The State Engineer, after reviewing the proof submitted by 
Respondent, issued Certificate of Appropriation No. 36 86 to Respondent 
on May 3, 1949. 
Certificate of Appropriation No. 3686 involves an appropriation 
-3-
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by exchange. Under the provisions of the Certificate, water which 
has been stored in Lost Lake Reservoir on the headwaters of the Provo 
River is released and allowed to flow down the natural channel of the 
Provo River for use by the appropriators therefrom at their various 
points of diversion. In exchange for the water which Respondent re- I 
leases from Lost Lake Reservoir, it is allowed to divert 2.57 c.f.s. 
and 1.71 c.f.s. from Bridal Veil Falls Creek and Lost Creek, respect-
ively, near the mouth of Provo Canyon. Such water is diverted into 
the Provo City municipal system and co-mingled with other municipal 
water for use within Provo City. However, the maximum quantity of I 
water that Respondent is allowed to divert and use under Certificate 
No. 3686 is 321.78 acre feet annually. A copy of Certificate No. 3686 
is attached to this brief as Appendix A. This Court has ruled that it •• 
can take judicial notice of the records in the State Engineer's office, 
McGary v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948); American Fork 




POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF RESPONDENT'S ACTION FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENT TO FILE AN 
ACTION TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER WITHIN SIXTY 
DAYS AFTER THE STATE ENGINEER ISSUED CERTIFICATE NO. 36 86 ON MAY 3, 
1949. 
A. Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 19 53, as Amended, Provides 
the Exclusive Procedure for Reviewing the Decisions of the 
State Engineer. 
The express purpose of Respondent's action is to have the Court 
overturn and set aside the State Engineer's decision of May 3, 1949 
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Certificate No. 3686* In essence, Respondent is requesting the Court 
to direct the State Engineer to allow Respondent to more than double 
this right. This is a direct attack upon Certificate No. 3686 and 
upon the State Engineer's decision of May 3, 19 49, limiting Responden 
to 321.78 acre feet of water annually under said Certificate. Respon-
dent elected not to appeal the Engineer's decision within sixty days 
after the Certificate was issued, but is now belatedly attempting to 
challenge it. However, Respondent's action is fatally defective be-
cause it was filed 23 years and 194 days too late. There is absolute 
no basis for such an action at this late date. While all decisions 
issued by the State Engineer are subject to judicial review, such re-
view can only be accomplished by following the terms and provisions 
of Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1.953> as amended. This stat-
ute provides the exclusive procedure for reviewing decisions of the 
State Engineer, and any such review must be initiated within sixty 
days following the State Engineer's decision. Section 73-3-14 provid< 
in part that: 
In any case where a decision of the state engineer is 
involved any person aggrieved by such decision may within 
sixty days after notice thereof bring a civil action in 
the district court for a plenary review thereof. 
This Court has expressly held that this procedure is the only 
method by which a decision of the State Engineer may be reviewed, 
Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 189 P.2d 701 (1948). In Glenwood 
Irrigation Co. v. Myers, 24 U.2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970), the State 
Engineer had, on February 11, 19 73, approved defendant's application 
within which to resume use of water from Glenwood Springs over plain-
tiff's protest. Plaintiff waited almost five years after the decisioi 
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of the State Engineer to file an action in the District Court to 
declare defendant's right forfeited and to enjoin the further use 
of water. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court and re-
manded the matter to the District Court with directions to enter 
judgment for the defendant. In doing so, this Court ruled that 
Section 73-3-14 is the only method by which a decision of the State 
Engineer may be reviewed: -
The precise question of forfeiture was put in issue 
' before the state engineer, and plaintiff had available 
the procedure in Section 73-3-14, U.C.A., 1953, to deter-
mine the validity of defendant's right. An appeal is 
the only method provided in the statute by which a deci-
sion of the state engineer may be reviewed. (Emphasis 
added) 
The sixty day period therein provided for in Section 73-3-14 is 
jurisdictional. In re Application No. 7600, 63 Utah 311, 225 Pac. 
605 (1924). In that case, this Court, in construing Chapter 67, 
Section 54, Session Laws of Utah 1919, which has since been amended 
and is now Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 19 53, noted on page 
607 of the Pacific Reporter that the manner of taking an appeal under 
that statute was indefinite, except that the appeal must be taken 
within sixty days counting from the date when notice is given to the 
party affected by the decision. It was also pointed out that the 
appeal should be taken in the manner provided for appeals from Justices 
Courts. Timely filing of a Notice of Appeal from the Justices or 
City Court to the District Court, together with payment of the fees 
for docketing the appeal in the District Court, is jurisdictional. 
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Buckner v. Main Realty and Insurance Co., 4 U.2d 124, 288 P.2d 786 
(1955); Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras, 11 U.2d 357, 359 P.2d 
21 (1961); Marsh v. Utah Homes, Inc., 17 U.2d 248, 408 P.2d 906 
(1965). Likewise, timely filing of a Notice of Appeal from a 
judgment in the District Court to the Supreme Court is jurisdictiona 
Anderson v. Anderson, 3 U.2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955); Watson v. 
Anderson, 29 U.2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973). Thus, the District Cour 
in this action is clearly without jurisdiction to entertain Respon-
dent's request to overturn a decision made by the State Engineer mor< 
than twenty-three years ago and should have dismissed this action. 
B. A Decision of the State Engineer Which is not Appealed 
Within Sixty Days is Final and not Subject to Collateral 
Attack. 
A Certificate of Appropriation issued by the State Engineer pur-
suant to the statutory procedure is not subject to a collateral 
attack which would nullify its effect. Warren Irrigation Company v. 
Charlton, 58 Utah 113, 197 Pac. 1030 (1921). Similarly, in North 
Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Company, 118 Utah 600, 
223 P.2d 577 (1950), it was held that property owners who claimed 
an impairment of their rights by a ruling of the Public Service 
Commission, and who were not satisfied with the order as entered, 
should have sought relief by requesting a further hearing before 
the Public Service Commission or by an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Since they did not, the order of the Public Service Commission was 
binding upon the parties the same as a judgment, and was not subject 
to collateral attack in a subsequent condemnation proceedings: 
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If defendant Gibbs or other affected property owners 
claimed an impairment of their rights by the rulings made 
and were not satisfied with the order as entered, then 
their relief was by requesting a further hearing before 
the Public Service Commission or by appeal to this court. 
Not having taken steps to have the order modified or 
changed, the same has the effect of a judgment and its 
legality cannot be attacked in this proceedings. (Emphasis 
added). 
For similar decisions from other Western States, see Southeast 
Colorado Power Ass'n. v. Public Utilities Comm., 163 Colo. 92, 428 
P.2d 939 (1967); Campbell v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa 
County, 18 Ariz. App. 287, 501 P.2d 463 (1972); Mosman v. Mathison, 
90 Idaho 76, 408 P.2d 450 (1965); In re Malofs Estate, 244 Or. 490, 
356 P.2d 957 (1960). 
The purpose of the time limit prescribed in Section 73-3-14 is 
the same as the purpose behind the time limit of all other appeal 
statutes. It is to settle controversies once and for all within a 
prescribed period. In Croft v. Croft, 21 U.2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 
(1968), this Court noted that litigation must be put to an end, and 
it is the function of a final judgment to do just that. A judgment 
is the final consideration and determination of a court on matters 
submitted to it in an action or proceeding. This Court further noted 
that if a judgment can mean one thing one day and something else 
on another day, there would be no reason to suppose that the liti-
gation had been set to rest. The same is true with respect to 
decisions of administrative agencies such as the State Engineer. 
Individual water rights are a matter of extreme importance in this 
State. Every water user is entitled to know with certainty that 
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once his right is defined he can rely upon it without fear of collat 
eral attack. Likewise, once a certificate of appropriation is issue* 
and the time for appeal has expired, junior appropriators are entitli 
to rely on the rights established thereby without fear that such 
rights will be enlarged in the future. Further, sound and proper 
water administration can only be carried out by the State Engineer 
with a firm and fixed definition of the individual users rights. An] 
thing short of this will lead to chaos in our water right structure. 
As pointed out in the following section, these are the very things 01 
Water Code was designed to avoid. 
C. Stability of Individual Water Rights and Proper Water 
Administration Depend Upon the Finality of the State 
Engineer's Decisions. 
The fundamental purpose in the creation of the office of State 
Engineer in Utah, as in other Western States, was to provide an ordei 
system for the allocation and administration of water rights. When 
appropriation practices first developed in the West, users establishe 
rights by simply diverting the water from its accustomed channel and 
placing it to beneficial use. But, as the settlement and development 
progressed, more and more people used water from a common supply, and 
problems developed when there was not sufficient water to satisfy all 
the uses on the stream. Thus, as disputes arose, users were forced t 
litigate their rights, and—while the courts were an adequate forum t< 
solve these individual disputes—there was no means to solve the re-
peating nature of the problem. In other words, a user may have been 
required to defend his right against a number of different users at 
various times in order to obtain the water to which he was legally en-
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I 
titled. Because there was no administrative regulation, there was no- "* 
thing to stop additional users from attempting to initiate a right, 
even though the stream was already over-appropriated. Further, there 
was no record defining the amount and extent of the various rights. §jj 
Existing users were left in the difficult position of not knowing the 
interrelationship of all of the rights on the stream, and potential user 
had no way of knowing the amount of water available for new development. " 
•n 
Such uncertainties made the investment of capitol in water projects ris-
m 
ky, and hampered the development and utilization of the State's water ^ 
resources. Thus, it became imperative to provide a system for the or- « 
derly administration of the water resources which would make all water 
rights of record and would define individual rights with certainty and I 
finality. The Utah Water Code which created the office of the State 
Engineer was enacted by the Legislature to satisfy this need. | 
All applications, as well as all change applications, must be init-
 m 
iated with the State Engineer and first must be decided by the Engineer," 
and second by the court if his decision is appealed. However, if no "^  
appeal is taken within the sixty-day period, the decision of the State 
Engineer becomes final. Also, the Engineer fixes the time when the J 
water must be placed to beneficial use under an approved application or 
change and, for good cause shown, may grant additional time to accom- * 
plish the development. When the development is complete, the applicant • 
must file his Proof of Appropriation or Change with the State Engineer. 
The Engineer then issues a Certificate of Appropriation or Change, basedB 
upon such proof. The Certificate beocmes the applicant's evidence of 
the perfected right. I 
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Thus, the State Engineer has the statutory responsibility for the 
administration and appropriation of the waters of the State. In carr 
ing out this responsibility, he must make literally hundreds of deci-
sions each year with respect to individual water rights. While the L 
islature has made the State Engineer's decisions subject to judicial 
review, only a small percentage of his decisions are actually appealer 
However, if users are able to reach back and challenge decisions of 
the State Engineer without regard to the limitations contained in 
Section 73-3-14, titles to individual water rights are placed in jeo-
pardy and the certainty which our Water Code was intended to provide 
to individual users is lost. For example, many applications to 
appropriate water are protested, and numerous of these applications 
are approved over protest. If protestants are not required under 
the provisions of Section 73-3-14 to appeal the State Engineer's deci-
sion within sixty days, applicants are placed in the untenable positi< 
of having to expend funds to develop the water while lacking the con-
fidence which now exists that their right is valid and justifies the 
expenditure of funds. 
When an appropriation is completed, the Certificate of Appropria-
tion constitutes the measure and limit of the user's right. If users 
are able to go behind a Certificate years after it is issued and en-
large the quantity of water to which they are entitled, all rights 
with a later priority will suffer. This is so because for whatever 
increased right is acquired there will be a corresponding reduction 
in the amount of water available for subsequent rights. Since most 
of Utah's streams are fully appropriated, any enlargement in earlier 
rights can only result in an impairment of junior rights. Further, 
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the State Engineer must be able to rely on the records in his office 
when administering these streams and in making decisions with regard 
to whether there is water available for appropriation. If users are 
to continue to expend funds for the development and use of our water 
resources, and if the State Engineer.is to be able to properly admin-
ister water rights, it is imperative that decisions of the State 
Engineer be final and binding when not appealed in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 73-3-14. Anything short of this will 
result in instability and uncertainty in individual water rights and 
will destroy the orderly administration of water rights which has 
existed in this State since the enactment of our Water Code, more 
than seventy years ago. 
POINT II. RESPONDENT'S ACTION IS BARRED AND MUST BE DISMISSED 
UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-3-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
19 53, AS AMENDED, FOR FAILURE TO FILE AN ACTION TO REVIEW THE STATE 
ENGINEER'S DECISION OF MAY 3, 19 49, WITHIN SIXTY DAYS AFTER CERTIFI-
CATE NO. 3686 WAS ISSUED. 
Section 73-3-15, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, specifies, in part, 
that: 
. . . An action to review a decision of the State Engineer 
shall be dismissed upon application of any party or by the 
court on its own motion, if the complaint was not filed or 
the summons not served within sixty days after notice of 
the decision. (Emphasis added) 
The clear and positive language of this statute makes the dis-
missal of Respondent's action mandatory, since it provides that any 
action to review a decision of the State Engineer which is not comm-
enced within sixty days shall be dismissed. The use of such positive 
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language certainly indicates that the Legislature intended such 
result. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, §§25.04 and 57.03, 
4th ed. (19 72). To interpret such a clear legislative mandate as 
discretionary would violate the literal meaning of the statute and 
would ignore a clearly expressed legislative intent contrary to the 
accepted cannons of statutory construction. Sands, Sutherland Stat-
utory Construction, §§46.02 and 46.03, 4th ed. (1972). Even if ther 
were any doubt—which there is not—concerning the legislative inten 
this statute must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
over-all public purpose which our Water Code sought to achieve. The 
public policy of this State favors stability of individual water 
rights and orderly water right administration, and the Legislature 
adopted and implemented our Water Code for this purpose. As discuss* 
under Point I.e.# the finality of the State Engineer's decisions is 
an integral and necessary part of this legislative program. If Sec-
tion 73-3-15 were considered to be discretionary, it would frustrate 
this legislative purpose. Any doubts concerning the meaning of this 
statute must be resolved in furthering and carrying out the public 
policy of the State. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 
§§56.01, 56.02 and 57.04, 4th ed. (1972). To suggest that Respondeni 
can directly attack a decision 23 years and 254 days after it is 
issued is to ignore and violate the unequivocal mandate of Section 
73-3-15. This section is a bar to Respondent's action, and the 
trial court should have dismissed Respondent's Complaint in accord-
ance with Appellants' Motion to Dismiss. 
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In any event, the case of Glenwood Irrigation Co, v. Myers, supra, 
is dispositive of this matter. In that decision, this Court squarely 
held that an aggrieved party could not sit by and ignore the sixty-day 
statutory appeal period provided for in Section 73-3-14, and then chal-
lenge a decision of the State Engineer in a collateral action some five 
years later. The statutory procedure for reviewing a decision of the 
State Engineer is exclusive. Since Respondent elected not to follow m 
this procedure, it cannot now complain that the decision of the State • 





Section 73-3-14 provides the exclusive procedure for reviewing 
decisions of the State Engineer, and the sixty-day limitation provided 
in this statute is jurisdictional. Consequently, the District Court 
had no jurisdiction to entertain Respondent's action, which is a dir-
ect attack upon Certificate No. 3686 filed more than twenty-three years 
after the State Engineer's decision was issued. If the filing of this 
action at this late date is proper under the law, then none of the Cer-
tificates issued by the State Engineer during the past seventy-two years 
from which no appeal has been taken is final, and any person who may » 
have been aggrieved thereby could today file an action in the District 
Court and have that Certificate modified or set aside. This is the 
very thing which the appeal statute was designed to prevent. We respect-
i fully submit that under the clear, positive and mandatory language of 
Section 73-3-15, Respondent's action must be dismissed with prejudice. i 
i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
DALLIN W. JENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
442 State Capitol Building 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 84114 
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Provo River Water Users Association, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
3 5 1 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
Attorney for Intervenor-Appellant 
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 
RAY L . MONTGOMERY 
A s s i s t a n t C i t y A t t o r n e y 
1 0 1 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
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JAMES B. LEE 
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_ V X X A X W U L ^ r A W K O P R I A T I O N O F W A T E R 
STATE OF UTAH 
A P P L I C A T I O N NO^^_2a7Z^rl^_105B6 ar.u 10347 C E R T I F I C A T E N O 3686 
<\ NAME AND ADDRESS O F APPROPRIATOR ? ^ V U C O T 
•Xj LOST LA/C^ APP.iuPi-.iAflOi*, BfilUAL V'^IL 
H SOURCE O F S U P P L Y - E A I L S . „ ^ 4 t 4 _ c t ^ L O j f . . ^ ^ ^ > _ ^ ^ i i y i g L _ . I N _ 1L£>£* _ . .COUN r lT , UTAH; _ ^ ^ . M ^ Aflii *i5±P"l:,f_ ?^Yi±R__DRAINAGE AREA 
g r ^ ; HU:;D;L;D -rv^ iUT o;^ ^JJ S.V^J/Y .iioir/ 10547 - DZG:2'BSR 22, 1923 
m QUANTITY O F WATER 0 ^ HUapiaDfliS Q21.1%)_J£&C^W PRIORITY O F KIGHT Igggo » JANUARY 1 9 , 1929 
p j ^ryTT^^XTi^TT'Xicrt i5,~T903 
£* PERIOD AND NATURE O F TTSK STJi^D r\iJH OSTO^?. 1 uf 0 ^ , 7 J Ah TO JULY 1 0F_ fiU Y.,AA FOIIOV.rvG; fL^AS-D A^D JiXC HANGED
 F 0 R ^ g F ^ Q ^ 
^ ' JU;;J i ro o:rj&:i i UF :,A:M Y:;AR FCSL ^raciPAL" :UR?;X^S " 
pO3lj£r£H0, It has been made to appear to the satisfaction of the undersigned that the appropriation of water lias been perfected in accordance with the Laws 
of Utah; ©{jer^fore, Be it known that I, iiMQLD..A....LISS. the duly appointed, qualified and acting State Engineer, by authority of 
the Laws of Utah, do hereby certify that said appropriator is entitled to the use of water as herein set out, subject to prior rights, if any, for diversion and use 
as follows, to-ivit:— 
The water covered b / t h i s combined appropr ia t ion and exchange i s yielded by Lost Lake on the head waters of Provo River , tha i n t e r -
sec t ion of the long i tud ina l a x i s and cen te r l i n e of the stream bed be in/? s i t ua t ed S I S ^ ' A 3496.8 f t . fro?* V.! Cor. Sec. 5 T2S R9'Z SLBfcM. 
The water a f t e r having been s tored i s released as hereinbefore def ined, allowed t o flow dovm the na tu ra l channel of Frovo River and i s used 
by the a p p r o p r i a t e s therefrom at t h e i r var ious poin ts of d ivers ion as heretofore e s t a b l i s h e d , and used in accordance with tha r i r h t s 
provided i n each i n s t a n c e . In l i e u of said v.ater thus used there i s d iver ted from two sources of supply, for convenience descr ibed a s 
l*cs. 1 and 2 as fol lows: No. 1 i s a r i g h t t o the exchange of water from 3r ida l Veil F a l l s Creek under 3xchan£e Appl icat ion :-Jo. 10547, the 
point a t which i t i s d iver ted being s i tua ted S6°46,/« 676.4 f t . from )•;]; Cor. Sec. 34 T5S H32 SLBiK. The maximum ra t e of d i v e r s i o n from 
t h i s source i s 2.57 s s c . f t . fne water thus d iver ted e n t e r s the municipal supply l i n e from Provo City a t a point s i t u a t e d 378*13'':•/ 1232.3 
f t . from 3£ Cor. Sec. 33 T53 fljiS SLB&H. No. 2 i s a r i g h t t o the exchange of water from Lo3t Creek under Exchange Appl icat ion No. 10536, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the point a t which i t i s d iver ted bein-r s i t ua t ed iJ4i°02'W 25JQ*5 f t . fro;:: .J^ Cor. Sec. 33 T5S -£3C SL3v:*-;. Th^ maximum r a t e of d ive r s ion 
from t h i s source i s 1.71 sec . f t . fne -va*^r thus d iver ted en t e r s tne municipal supply l i n e cf Provo City a t a point s i t u a t e d S73d54'>/ 
1536.8 f t . froin ij* Cor. said .>ec. 3 3 . fne i i rrdt of the yea r ly d ive rs ions froia the two sources taken in exchange are a s fo l lows: Bridal 
Veil F a l l s Creek 111.43 acre f t . , Lost Creek 210.30 acre f t . Tie *a te r under the two exchange app l i ca t i ons mentioned i s conrointfled in 
said Provo municipal supply l i n e .vifch the o ther water ana flows down said supply l i n e through Sec. 3 3 , l a s t aforesaid township and ran^e , 
through Sees . 4 , 5, 6 , 7, 1#, 19 and Sec. 30, ToS nj^ SLBid*;, and e n t e r s the municipal d i s t r i b u t i o n r e s e r v o i r , s i t ua t ed ft31#G3,T.v 1034 .3f t . 
from S^ Cor. Sec. }0 l a s t aforesaid township and ranye, from which i t i s d i s t r i b u t e d through the municipal water system to the i n h a b i t a n t s 
of Provo Ci ty , where i t i s used for municipal purposes. 
Trie r i g h t s under t n i s c e r t i f i c a t e e n t i t l e the holder t o d i v e r t water from Bridal Veil ? a l i s Creek and Los1. ---change pur-
poses , only in i d e n t i c a l f lo*s and i n equal amounts concurrent ly with equal r e leases from. Lost Lake and i t s del:.'. j * y .. var ious po in t s 
of d i v e r s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y t ha t of the p a r t i e s to whorr. the var ious r i y h t s are e n t i t l e d p a r t i c u l a r l y the Utah Power & Light Co. , both as t o 
present d ive r s ions and as they rr^ ay be cons t i tu t ed i n the f u t u r e . 
The works employed i n t h i s appropr ia t ion are t o be operated and maintained in such inanner and condit ion a s w i l l prevent waste of 
water . 
($Xi $$iin£B& ^Uijemif, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of my office this .J?£d.; 
STATE ENGINEER 
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